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1. Introduction 
 
The increasing inequality of income, wealth, employment opportunities, etc., 
is a topic of deep concern not only to economists but also to policymakers and to the 
public at large in all countries, and bequests and other intergenerational transfers have 
been suggested as one cause of increasing inequalities.  If individuals leave 
substantial bequests and other intergenerational transfers, if bequests are unrequited 
(involving no quid pro quo), and if wealthier individuals leave more bequests, bequests 
will increase the inequality of the wealth distribution and cause wealth inequalities to 
be passed on from generation to generation.  The purpose of this paper is to test each 
of these three premises in turn. 
 
2. The Data Source 
 
The data I use is this paper are taken from the “Setai-nai Bunpai to Sedai-kan 
Iten ni kansuru Kenkyuu Chousa (Survey of Intra-household Distribution and 
Intergenerational Transfers),” which was conducted in Japan during the October 
6-December 8, 2006, period by the Institute for Research on Household Economics 
(Zaidan Houjin Kakei Keizai Kenkyuusho).  This survey surveyed married women 
between the ages of 20 and 59 from throughout Japan using a paper questionnaire that 
was dropped off, then picked up later.  4200 households were selected and surveyed 
using a two-stage sampling procedure, resulting in 2814 observations (a response rate 
of 67.00%).  This survey collects detailed information on bequests including 
information on bequests received, bequest motives, bequest division, etc., and thus is 
ideally suited to an analysis of bequests (see Sakamoto (2008) for more details on this 
survey). 
The number of observations in the aforementioned survey is 2,814, but only 
1,778 observations remained after deleting observations with missing information on 
bequests received, holdings of financial assets and real assets, and loans outstanding. 
All monetary variables except for holdings of real assets are in category form 
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and thus were converted to continuous form as follows: households that selected 
categories other than the lowest and highest categories were assigned the midpoint of 
the lower bound and the upper bound of the category they selected.  Households that 
selected the lowest category were assigned a value equal to 0.8 times the upper bound 
of the lowest category.  Finally, households that selected the highest category were 
asked the actual value of their holdings of the asset or liability in question, and if they 
answered this question, they were assigned the actual value of their holdings.  If they 
did not answer this question, they were assigned a value equal to 1.25 times the lower 
bound of the highest category.  
   
3. Do Individuals Leave Substantial Bequests? 
 
The data source we use is unusual in collecting data on the value of bequests 
(financial assets such as bank and postal deposits, negotiable securities, etc., as well as 
real assets such as land, housing, etc.) received from already deceased parents and/or 
parents-in-law.  As Table 1 shows, respondents receiving bequests from already 
deceased parents and/or parents-in-law received an average of 14.334 million yen (or 
143,340 U.S. dollars assuming an exchange rate of 100 yen per dollar).   However, 
since only 23.96 percent of respondents had received bequests from already deceased 
parents and/or parents-in-law, the average bequest received of all households was only 
3.434 million yen (or 34,340 dollars).   
The total wealth (net worth) of respondents can be calculated by subtracting debt 
outstanding (housing debt and non-housing debt outstanding) from the sum of financial 
assets (bank and postal deposits, negotiable securities, life insurance, etc.) and real 
assets (land, housing, etc.).  The average wealth (net worth) of respondents thus 
calculated was 22.627 million yen (or 226,270 dollars), so the average bequest 
received of respondents receiving bequests from their parents and/or parents-in-law 
was a full 63.35% of average net worth but the average bequest received of all 
households was only 15.18% of their average net worth. 
Finally, it is possible to calculate life cycle wealth by subtracting bequests 
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received from total wealth (net worth), and if this is done, life cycle wealth amounts to 
19,193 million yen (or 191,930 dollars).  This implies that the average bequest 
received of all households was only 17.89% of life cycle wealth, meaning that the 
wealth of respondents increased by only 17.89% as a result of receiving bequests from 
their parents and/or parents-in-law. 
Many researchers have attempted to measure the share of bequests and other 
intergenerational transfers in total household wealth, the best-known attempt being that 
of Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), who obtained the surprising finding that 
intergenerational transfers account for about 80 percent of total household wealth in 
the United States.  By contrast, Modigliani (1988) obtained the diametrically opposed 
finding that intergenerational transfers account for only about 20 percent of total 
household wealth in the United States (see also Kotlikoff (1988)).  
A number of researchers have done a similar calculation for Japan, including 
Hayashi (1986), who found that intergenerational transfers account for at least 9.6% of 
total household wealth, Dekle (1989), who obtained figures of 3-27% and at most 
48.7%, depending on the calculation method used, Campbell (1997), who obtained 
figures of at most 28.1% and at most 23.4%, depending on the calculation method used, 
Barthold and Ito (1992), who obtained a range of 27.8-41.4%, and Horioka, et al. 
(2002), who obtained a figure of 23.9%.  Thus, the results for Japan are closer to 
Modigliani’s (1988) figure than to Kotlikoff and Summers’ (1981) figure, and the 
15.18% figure obtained in the current study is no exception.１  It thus appears that 
individuals do not leave substantial bequests in Japan. 
 
4. Are Bequests Unrequited? 
 
 The survey we used in our analysis also asked respondents about whether they 
plan to leave a bequest to their children and how they plan to divide their bequest 
among their children, and according to the results of the survey, 48.16% of respondents 
with two or more children plan to divide their bequest equally, 29.90% do not plan to 
leave a bequest, and 21.94% plan to divide their bequest unequally, with the vast 
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majority of those in the third group planning to leave more to the child who lives with 
or near them, who provides help with housework, who provides nursing care, who 
provides financial assistance, and/or who takes over the family name or the family 
business.  Thus, more than half (51.84%) of respondents either do not plan to leave a 
bequest or plan to leave more to the child who provides some sort of quid pro quo, 
most commonly some sort of assistance during old age (see Horioka (2008) for more 
details).  Thus, it seems that more than half of Japanese are selfishly motivated, either 
not leaving any bequest at all or requiring a quid pro quo such as assistance during old 
age.  Moreover, other surveys have asked similar questions and obtained broadly 
consistent results (see, for example, Horioka, et al. (2000) and Horioka (2002), and see 
also Horioka (1993), Hayashi (1995), and Wakabayashi and Horioka (2008) for other 
types of evidence on this issue).  
 
5. Are Wealthier Individuals More Likely to Receive Bequests? 
 
 If wealthier individuals are more likely to receive bequests, bequests will 
contribute to exacerbating wealth inequalities, but our results show that the correlation 
between bequests received and life cycle wealth is -0.170, meaning that wealthier 
individuals leave less bequests than less wealthy individuals, implying that bequests 
actually ameliorate wealth inequalities.２ 
 The coefficient of variation of life cycle wealth and total household wealth are 
1.54 and 1.34, respectively, meaning that the coefficient of variation decreases by 0.20 
when bequests received are included in household wealth.  This finding is consistent 
with our aforementioned finding that wealthier individuals leave less bequests and that 
bequests ameliorate wealth inequalities. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
     I analyzed data from a new and unique Japanese household survey and obtained 
the following findings: individuals in Japan do not appear to leave very significant 
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bequests, with bequests received accounting for only about 15 percent of total 
household wealth, and parents often require a quid pro quo (such as some sort of 
assistance during old age) for bequests left to their children, meaning that net transfers 
from parents to children (net of transfers in the other direction such as financial and 
in-kind assistance from children to parents during old age) are even less important than 
the above figure suggests.  Furthermore, even if bequests were quantitatively 
important, wealthier individuals leave less bequests than less wealthy individuals, 
meaning that bequests ameliorate wealth inequalities rather than exacerbating them and 
do not cause wealth inequalities to be passed on from generation to generation.  Thus, 
it does not appear necessary to alleviate the adverse impact of bequests on wealth 
inequalities by raising inheritance taxes or using other means. 
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１ It is low even compared to other studies for Japan, and one possible reason is that it 
does not include inter vivos transfers. 
 
２ If the relative importance of inter vivos transfers increases with wealth due to tax 
considerations, etc., the correlation between bequests received and life cycle wealth 
might overstate the correlation between all intergenerational transfers and life cycle 
wealth.  Unfortunately, we cannot confirm this point because the data set used in this 
paper does not collect information on inter vivos transfers.  I am indebted to 
Kazuyasu Sakamoto for this point.  
